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SEVERN v. ADIDAS SPORTSCHUHFABRIKEN:
CALIFORNIA'S LONG-ARM POWERS AND
IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS
FOR NONRESIDENTS
California courts have joined with the great majority of states in
accepting the common law immunity rule.' This rule protects nonresi-
dent witnesses, litigants, and others who are within a jurisdiction to at-
tend court proceedings from the effects of any valid service of process
which may be made upon them while they are present within the
forum. Recently, in Severn v. Adidas Sportschuhfabriken,2 the district
court of appeal held that the doctrine is no longer the law in California.
The court determined that the reasons for granting immunity to non-
residents had been eliminated by California's new long-arm statute,
which became operative in 1970 and which greatly extended Cali-
fornia's powers of judicial jurisdiction over nonresidents.'
The Severn decision has little value as precedent, both because it
was decided by a district court of appeal' and because no hearing be-
fore the Supreme Court of California was requested.' The case is not
without importance, however. The Severn court is the first California
1. See generally M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 47 n.166 (1972) [herein-
after cited as BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE]; 62 AM. JUR. Process §§ 136-56 (2d ed. 1972).
2. 33 Cal. App. 3d 754, 109 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1973).
3. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 410.10, 413.10 (West 1973) (added by Cal. Stat.
1969, ch. 1610, § 3, operative July 1, 1970).
4. Until the Severn decision, the immunity rule was consistently upheld by Cali-
fornia courts, including the supreme court. See notes 20-48 and accompanying text in-
fra. "Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are
required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction . . . . The deci-
sions of [the state supreme court] are binding upon and must be followed by all the
state courts of California. . . . Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the
law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to
overrule decisions of a higher court." Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.
2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937, 939-40, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325-26 (1962). Also, proposi-
tions of law laid down in the district courts of appeal are never binding on the supreme
court. Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 472, 283 P.2d 19, 24 (1955).
5. The authority of a decision by the district court of appeal in which there has
been no petition for hearing in the supreme court is questionable. See Wogman v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 123 Cal. App. 2d 657, 664, 267 P.2d 423, 428 (1954); Hunter v. Sparling,
87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 724, 197 P.2d 807, 815 (1948); 6 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCE-
DURE Appeal § 700 (2d ed. 1971).
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court to examine the immunity rule in light of California's new jurisdic-
tional laws; and it is likely that other courts, if not required to follow
the Severn decision, will at least examine its reasoning in determining
whether the immunity rule should still be applied in this state.
This note will analyze the Severn court's decision to assess its use-
fulness as a guide in future cases dealing with the immunity rule. Pre-
liminary to this analysis, a discussion of the origins of the immunity rule
and its development in California will be helpful. Since the court
based its holding on the changes in judicial jurisdiction effected by Cali-
fornia's new long-arm statute, these changes will also be reviewed.
Facts of the Case and the Court's Holding
Facts
The plaintiff, Clifford Severn, doing business as Clifford Severn
Sporting Goods, brought an action in California state court against three
European corporations and Horst Dassler, a resident of France. De-
fendant Dassler was personally served in the California action on be-
half of himself and the defendant corporations pursuant to section
416.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.6
The service was made upon Dassler while he was in Florida,
where he had gone for the sole purpose of giving his deposition in an
action which one of the defendant corporations had commenced in the
United States District Court in Florida.7 The defendants moved to
quash the service of summons made upon them in Florida, basing this
motion on the "immunity rule."" The trial court granted the motion,
and the plaintiff appealed. Neither side seemed to have questioned
that the defendants would be subject to the jurisdiction of the California
court if the service were allowed.'
The Holding: The Immunity Rule is No Longer the Law in California
On appeal, the conflict of laws problem raised in this case was re-
solved in favor of California,' ° the court looking to California law to
6. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 416.10 (West 1973). Section 416.10(b) provides for
summons to be served on a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and com-
plaint to the president or head of the corporation, a vice president, secretary or assistant
secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a general manager, or a person authorized
to receive service by the corporation.
7. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 756, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
8. Id. For a discussion of the immunity rule, see text accompanying notes 13-
67 infra.
9. Id. See discussion of in personam jurisdiction and CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §
410.10 in text accompanying notes 68-111 infra.
10. Since Horst Dassler had been served while participating in an action before
the United States District Court in Florida, the court was required to determine which
determine whether the immunity rule supported the quashing of the
service of process upon the defendants.". A majority of the court held
that the rule itself was no longer valid in California, and denied the
motion on that ground. 2 Since the immunity doctrine is applied at the
court's discretion, the court could have reached the more limited deci-
immunity rule should be applied: the California rule, the Florida rule, or the federal
rule. The majority opinion discussed the conflict of laws problem only briefly, and con-
eluded that the doctrine of interstate comity did not require that the federal or Florida
immunity rule be applied, since either would conflict with California's strong public pol-
icy of allowing suitors to serve process on their debtors wherever they may find them.
33 Cal. App. 3d at 762-63, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 333. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 413.10
(West 1973). See Horowitz, Choice of Law: A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 719,
736 n.49, for the conclusion that Severn presents a "false-conflicts" situation.
Justice Sims' lengthy dissent was generated by this finding of the court, and not
by its decision to discard the California immunity rule. Sims strongly maintained that
the question of the validity of the California rule should never have been reached, be-
cause California law should not have been applied in the first place. Since it was the
federal district court in Florida whose proceedings would have been affected by service
of process on the foreign witness, Justice Sims felt that the federal rule or the Florida
rule should have been controlling. He also concluded that it would be unfair for Cali-
fornia to deny Dassler immunity and retain jurisdiction when Dassler had entered Flor-
ida with the expectation of immunity from service of process in both the federal and
state courts in Florida. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 776-77, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44 (Sims, J.,
dissenting).
However, in his discussion of cases where two forums were involved so that the
court had to decide whose immunity rule to apply, Justice Sims only introduced one case
where the two courts involved were located in different states, rather than being a fed-
eral court and a state court in a single state. See Durst v. Tautges, Wilder & McDonald,
44 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1930) (removed to federal court on diversity grounds, where mo-
tion to quash summons was granted and affirmed), cited in Severn, 33 Cal. App. 3d
at 772-73, 109 Cal. Rptr, at 340 (Sims, J., dissenting). The one California case which
has dealt with the situation, Hand v. Superior Court, appears to hold that where no Cali-
fornia policy is served by granting immunity to a nonresident involved in an action be-
fore the court of another state, then immunity should be denied. 42 Cal. App. 168, 183
P. 456 (1919). See 2 B. WrrKaN, CAL. PROCEDURE Actions § 584 (2d ed. 1970) which
also discusses the Hand decision. Considering the lack of authority, and the inconsis-
tency of the authority which does exist, it does not appear that the defendant could have
relied on receiving immunity from service of process from another state's court when
he entered Florida, even if he could have expected such immunity to be granted by state
and federal courts in Florida.
Justice Sims's major fear was that the implementation of a new California rule abol-
ishing the immunity doctrine would leave any future judgment in the Severn case open
to collateral attack in other jurisdictions which retain the rule. This fear seems un-
founded since the general rule is that where the question of jurisdiction has been litigated
and finally decided in the court rendering the original judgment, that judgment is not
subject to collateral attack on jurisdictional grounds. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S.
106 (1963); Tomkins v. Tomkins, 89 Cal. App. 2d 243, 200 P.2d 821 (1948); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 720, 132 P.2d 70, cert. denied, 319
U.S. 774 (1942). See also 47 AM. JuR. Judgments § 1260 (2d ed. 1969); 11 CAL. JUR.
Conflicts of Law § 13 (2d ed. 1953); Annot., 52 A.L.R. 740, 741 (1928).
11. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 762-63, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
12. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
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sion that immunity from service was not warranted under the facts pre-
sented in the case. However, the wording used by the court indicates
that it did not limit itself to the situation before it, choosing instead to
consider the general question of the validity of the immunity rule and
holding that it is no longer the law in California. In so holding, the
court made a significant departure from previous California case law,
which had consistently recognized the immunity doctrine as part of the
common law of the state. A review of the origins of the immunity rule,
its development in California, and the criticisms which have been di-
rected against it is necessary to provide the background information
against which the Severn decision may be analyzed.
The Immunity Rule
Origins
The immunity rule is a seldom codified common law doctrine' 3
which developed in England at the time when service of civil process
was normally effected by arresting the defendant. 4 Its original pur-
pose was to prevent the court's own process from making suitors, wit-
nesses, and other persons indispensable to a proceeding unavailable to
attend court.' 5 Another reason for the privilege was the desire to pre-
serve the dignity of the court and to prevent the disruption which would
occur if service by arrest were made during the court proceedings. 16
Service of civil process is no longer effected by arrest, but the rule
has continued as a means of encouraging nonresident witnesses and
other nonresidents who are beyond the subpoena power of the court
to enter the jurisdiction to aid in the complete and fair adjudication of
controversies.1 7  In the United States, the immunity rule has been part
of the common law of every state. Although the doctrine differs
slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,' the general rule is that wit-
nesses and parties entering a forum to attend court proceedings are im-
mune from the effects of a valid service of civil process for a reasonable
time while entering and leaving the jurisdiction, as well as while attend-
ing court.'9
13. 2 B. WrmrN, CALiFORNIA PRocEDURE Actions § 581 (2d ed. 1970)
14. Note, Privilege of Non-Residents Engaged in Public Duty from Service of
Process, 33 HARv. L. RFV. 721, 722 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Privilege of Non-Resi-
dents]. "[H]istorically, seizure was the proper way to commence a civil action ....
To find out whether the court had jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, one
looked in the dungeon; if he was there, the court had jurisdiction." Green, Jurisdictional
Reform in California, 21 HAS'INGS L.J. 1219, 1227 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Green].
15. Privilege of Non-Residents, supra note 14, at 722.
16. Wangler v. Harvey, 41 NJ. 277, 284, 196 A.2d 513, 517 (1963).
17. Privilege of Non-Residents, supra note 14, at 723.
18. See generally 62 AM. JUR. Process §§ 136-56 (2d ed. 1972).
19. Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916); BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE supra note
1, at 47 n.166; see, e.g., Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 253 P.2d 25 (1953).
Development of the Immunity Rule in California
In California, various classes of nonresidents may claim the bene-
fits of the immunity rule. It has, of course, been invoked both by non-
resident witnesses and by nonresident litigants.20  In recognition of
modem business practices, California courts have held that where a
nonresident is personally protected by the immunity rule because he
is within the state to attend judicial proceedings, his corporation will
be similarly protected from service of process made upon him on its
behalf in his capacity as an officer of the corporation.2 Litigants and
witnesses have not been the only court participants protected: nonresi-
dent attorneys involved in court actions in California have also been
able to claim immunity from service of civil process under the rule.
However, the courts have been more cautious in granting immunity to
nonresident attorneys than to either nonresident witnesses or nonresi-
dent litigants.22
There are various decisions which have established the circum-
stances under which a nonresident may claim the immunity privilege.
Initially, the immunity privilege could be extended to a nonresident
only if he were within the jurisdiction solely to attend court proceed-
ings. 23  However, California courts have gradually relaxed this limita-
tion, granting immunity when the nonresident conducts other business
or activities while within the jurisdiction, as long as his primary purpose
remains his attendance in court.24
Whether a nonresident who is attending court in another state may
claim immunity from service of process in a California action is unclear.
In one early case, immunity from service of civil process was denied
where the nonresident was within California to attend the taking of a
deposition to be used in an action before the courts of another state.
The court reasoned that the immunity rule did not apply, since no Cali-
fornia court proceedings would be hampered by the service of proc-
ess.2 5 The recent importance of this case is questionable, however,
20. See, e.g., Russell v. Landau, 127 Cal. App. 2d 682, 688, 274 P.2d 681, 685
(1954) (witness and party); Gerard v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. App. 2d 549, 205 P.2d
109 (1949) (witness and defendant); Hammons v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 700,
219 P. 1037 (1923) (witness).
21. See, e.g., Hammons v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 700, 219 P. 1037 (1923).
22. Tadge v. Byrnes, 179 Cal. 275, 276, 176 P. 439, 440 (1918) (limiting privilege
to attorney of record); Gaines v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 2d 749, 752-53, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 909, 911 (1961).
23. This strict rule was applied in Page v. Randall, 6 Cal. 32, 33 (1855).
24. See, e.g., Russell v. Landau, 127 Cal. App. 2d 682, 695, 274 P.2d 681, 690
(1954); Franklin v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 2d 292, 295, 220 P.2d 8, 10 (1950);
Gerard v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. App. 2d 549, 554, 205 P.2d 109, 112-13 (1949); Ham-
mons v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 700, 708, 219 P. 1037, 1040 (1923).
25. Hand v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 168, 169, 183 P. 456 (1919).
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since it was decided before long-arm statutes began to make various
nonresidents susceptible to service of process outside the state's bound-
aries.20
Within the last twenty-five years, the doctrine has been applied
to proceedings within the state which are not before a court but are
before an administrative body which is exercising a judicial function.2 7
Dicta in two California cases would even support the extension of the
immunity doctrine protection to nonresidents within the state to per-
form a public duty during a time of emergency, 28 although this seems
a significant departure from the traditional application of the rule to
protect judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
The major judicial exception to the application of the California
immunity rule occurs when the second action for which the service is
made arises out of, or involves, the same subject matter as the first ac-
tion. When the two actions are related, California courts have denied
immunity from service of civil process to witnesses, 29 attorneys, 0 and
parties to the original action.31 The federal courts have also recognized
this exception to the immunity rule. In Lamb v. Schmitt,3" the ra-
tionale behind the exception was discussed by the Supreme Court, which
reasoned that where the two actions are interrelated, the cause pend-
ing before the court is not subjected to delay or hindrance by the serv-
ice of process. On the contrary, the grant of immunity could actually
impede the court's task of administering justice by preventing the court
from making a final and successful adjudication of the matter. 3
In St. John v. Superior Court,34 a California appellate court ex-
panded this exception to the immunity rule. The court examined all
26. The Severn court, for example, did not rely on that early decision to find that
immunity should have been denied the defendants solely on the grounds that they were
involved in an action in Florida, and not in California. Instead, the Severn court chose
to consider the effect of the state's new long-arm provisions on the immunity doctrine
itself.
27. See, e.g., Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 292, 253 P.2d 25, 26
(1953) (disciplinary proceeding before the State Bar); St. John v. Superior Court, 178
Cal. App. 2d 794, 797, 3 Cal. Rptr. 535, 537-38 (1960) (licensing revocation hearing).
28. See Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 711-13, 16 P.2d 741, 742-43 (1932),
quoting Filer v. McCormick, 260 F. 309 (N.D. Cal. 1919); Tulley v. Superior Court,
45 Cal. App. 2d 24, 26-31, 113 P.2d 477, 478-80 (1941).
29. See Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 253 P.2d 25 (1953); Adler v.
Superior Court, 187 Cal. App. 2d 207, 9 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1960).
30. See Gaines v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 2d 749, 16 Cal. Rptr. 909
(1961).
31. Slosberg v. Municipal Court, 101 Cal. App. 2d 238, 225 P.2d 312 (1950); Von
Kesler v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 89, 292 P. 544 (1930).
32. 285 U.S. 222 (1932).
33. Id. at 227-28.
34. 178 Cal. App. 2d 794, 3 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1960).
the previous California cases in which immunity was denied a witness
or nonlitigant because the two actions were related, and concluded
that in each instance the petitioner had been either the instigator or
the moving party in the first action.35  However, it determined that a
witness in the first proceeding could be denied immunity in a second,
related action even if he did not fit in either category, as long as he
had a "personal interest" in the outcome of the first proceeding.36
Rationale for the Rule in California
California courts have not been entirely consistent in their efforts
to articulate a reason for the well-established common law doctrine of
immunity. Most have recognized the rule as a privilege of the court,37
a rationale which was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Lamb v. Schmitt.38  The reasoning of that case has been approvingly
cited in several California decisions.3 9 The Lamb court concluded that
the due administration of justice required that a court not permit inter-
ference with the progress of a cause of action pending before it by al-
lowing service of civil process to be made for other suits. The threat
of possible service might discourage the voluntary attendance of those
persons whose presence would be necessary or convenient to judicial
administration in the pending action.40 The court in Lamb not only
stated that the immunity rule was for the convenience of the court; it
stressed that it was not for the convenience of individuals before the
court.4 Only two California cases have followed the Lamb court's de-
cision on this point and concluded that immunity is a privilege of the
court but not of the individual.42
35. Id. at 798, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 538. But cf. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222 (1932).
36. 178 Cal. App. 2d at 798, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 539. In St. John, the petitioner was
served while testifying at the license revocation hearing of a brokerage firm which had
handled a sale of his corporation's stock. He was not personally involved in the revoca-
tion matter and was clearly attending only as a witness. Nevertheless, the court found
that he had a personal interest in the outcome of the hearing, because it could forestall
criminal action against him and his corporation arising from the same sale of stock.
37. See Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 292, 253 P.2d 25, 26 (1953);
Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 710, 16 P.2d 741, 742 (1932); Gaines v. Superior
Court, 196 Cal. App. 2d 749, 753, 16 Cal. Rptr. 909, 911 (1961); St. John v. Superior
Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 794, 799, 3 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539 (1960); Mattison v. Licblyter,
162 Cal. App. 2d 60, 63-64, 327 P.2d 599, 601 (1958); Hammons v. Superior Court,
63 Cal. App. 700, 708, 219 P. 1037, 1040 (1923); Hand v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App.
168, 169, 183 P. 456 (1919).
38. 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932).
39. See Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 291-92, 253 P.2d 25, 26 (1953);
Gaines v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 2d 749, 753, 16 Cal. Rptr. 909, 911 (1961);
St. John v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 794, 799-800, 3 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539 (1960).
40. 285 U.S. at 225.
41. Id.
42. See Gaines v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 2d 749, 753, 16 Cal. Rptr. 909,
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A rationale for the rule similar to that expressed by the Lamb
court has been advanced by the California courts which have framed
the reason for the immunity rule wholly or partially in terms of public
policy. Two courts have stated that the rule may be supported on the
ground that public policy disapproves of a court being hampered by
having those in attendance upon it subject to suit in other actions.43
More recently the California Supreme Court has concurred in this rea-
soning, stating that public policy supports the prevention of interrup-
tions and delays in judicial proceedings which may be caused when
necessary participants are required to defend in other actions. 44  The
court also felt there was a public interest in fostering voluntary appear-
ances by nonresidents who could not be forced to enter the jurisdiction
to testify, an interest which was served by the immunity rule.4 5
At least two California courts have based the immunity rule upon
the public policy that nonresident witnesses and parties should be able
to attend trial in a foreign jurisdiction without the threat of being sub-
jected to lawsuits. 46  This public policy consideration approaches the
recognition of the immunity privilege as a substantive right of the indi-
vidual. In fact, despite the Supreme Court's conclusion in Lamb that
immunity is a privilege of the court but not of the individual,47 several
California decisions have clearly stated that the immunity privilege is
an individual right as well.48
The Severn court followed the more recent California appellate
cases of St. John v. Superior Court49 and Gaines v. Superior Court5°
and adopted the rationale of Lamb v. Schmitt in its analysis of Cali-
fornia's immunity rule. It is interesting to note that the Severn court
discussed the "haphazard" development of the immunity rule in the
United States,5 ' but failed to acknowledge the existence of inconsistent
911 (1961); St. John v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 794, 799, 3 Cal. Rptr. 535,
539 (1960).
43. Hammons v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 700, 708, 219 P. 1037, 1040
(1923); Hand v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 168, 169, 183 P. 456 (1919).
44. Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 292, 253 P.2d 25, 26 (1953), cited
with approval in Mattison v. Lichlyter, 162 Cal. App. 2d 60, 63, 327 P.2d 599, 601
(195&).
45. Id.
46. See Muller v. Muller, 141 Cal. App. 2d 722, 729, 297 P.2d 789, 793 (1956);
Russell v. Landau, 127 Cal. App. 2d 682, 687, 274 P.2d 681, 685 (1954).
47. 285 U.S. at 225. See note 42 & accompanying text supra.
48. See Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 292, 253 P.2d 25, 26 (1953);
Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 710-11, 16 P.2d 741, 742 (1932); Mattison v. Lich-
lyter, 162 Cal. App. 2d 60, 64, 327 P.2d 599, 601 (1958); Hammons v. Superior Court,
63 Cal. App. 700, 708, 219 P. 1037, 1040 (1923); Hand v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App.
168, 169, 183 P. 456 (1919) (mentioning both rationales but not supporting either).
49. 178 Cal. App. 2d 794, 3 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1960).
50. 196 Cal. App. 2d 749, 16 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961).
51. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 329-30.
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rationales supporting the immunity doctrine in California.
Two principles expressed in the Lamb decision received special
attention from the Severn court and are important in the development
of its analysis of the immunity rule in light of the new California long-
arm statute. The first principle is that the immunity rule extends no
rights to nonresident witnesses but exists only for the benefit of the
court.52 The second is that the witness immunity privilege "should not
be enlarged beyond the reason upon which it is founded, and . . .
should be extended or withheld only as judicial necessities require. '' s
The Severn court's application of these two principles in its analysis of
California's immunity doctrine will be discussed later in this note.54
Criticism of the Immunity Rule
Although the immunity rule has been followed by most courts in
the United States, criticisms of the doctrine have been made. In dic-
tum, a Pennsylvania court recently supported the total elimination of
the rule, contending that the ease of modern transportation and com-
munication, the availability of new procedural methods for obtaining
trial evidence, and the expanding concepts of judicial jurisdiction may
make the doctrine unnecessary today. 55
The use of the immunity doctrine to induce nonresident witnesses
to aid the court's proceedings seems to retain validity, because the con-
duct of lawsuits can, in a real sense, be obstructed if witnesses who can-
not be compelled to attend refuse to do so." In contrast, the applica-
tion of the immunity rule to nonresident plaintiffs and defendants is
not supported by such compelling reasons, and a New Jersey case,
Wangler v. Harvey,57 has held that the immunity rule no longer applies
to parties litigant.
The Wangler court reasoned that plaintiffs enter the jurisdiction
not to aid the court in its administration of justice, but to serve their
own interest in obtaining a favorable judgment. 58 The authors of an
article critical of the immunity rule have argued that the possibility of
being served in another action while present to attend court will not
often deter a plaintiff from entering a jurisdiction to assert his legal
52. 285 U.S. at 225, discussed in Severn v. Adidas Sportschuhfabriken, 33 Cal.
App. 3d 754, 759, 109 Cal. Rptr. 328, 331 (1973).
53. 285 U.S. at 225, cited in Severn v. Adidas Sportschuhfabriken, 33 Cal. App.
3d 754, 760, 109 Cal. Rptr. 328, 331 (1973).
54. See text accompanying notes 121-24 infra.
55. Fahy v. Abattoir, 223 Pa. Super. 185, 189, 299 A.2d 323, 325 (1972).
56. Keeffe & Roscia, Immunity and Sentimentality, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 471, 479
(1947) [hereinafter cited as Keeffe & Roscia].
57. 41 N.J. 277, 196 A.2d 513 (1963).
58. Id. at 284, 196 A.2d at 517. See also Keeffe & Roscia, supra note 56, at 479,
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rights.5 9  Once present in the jurisdiction, the service of summons
should not be so distracting to a suitor that the interests of justice will
suffer. 0 These critics contend that the distraction which service in an-
other action is likely to cause a nonresident litigant would be similarly
distracting to a resident and that it has never been suggested that resi-
dents should be protected from service of civil process in additional
suits while they are involved in litigation. 61
Arguments opposing the extension of immunity from service of
process to nonresident defendants are not as persuasive, but they have
been asserted by critics of the doctrine and apparently convinced the
Wangler court. In the Wangler decision, the court felt that the defend-
ant, like the plaintiff, was motivated to come within the jurisdiction by
a personal desire: his wish to defend the suit.62 The court said that
a defendant must decide "whether the pains of other litigation are more
severe than the rigors of a default judgment in the first suit. ' 63 In an
article critical of the immunity rule, the authors have said that no court
interest or judicial necessity could be served by the defendant's pres-
ence, since the court could render a valid default judgment in the ac-
tion if the defendant chose not to appear. 64 However, a court's interest
in promoting justice and fairness for all parties to its proceedings sug-
gests that it should encourage the attendance of the nonresident who
wishes to defend the suit brought against him to the same extent that
it encourages the attendance of voluntary witnesses, and that the im-
munity privilege should be made as available to the one as to the other.
Another criticism of the immunity rule has been that it operates
in derogation of the common law right of the resident creditor to sue
his debtor wherever he may find him.65 The Severn court emphasized
the importance of this right, which it felt was given expression in Cali-
fornia through the enactment of the new long-arm statute allowing for
greatly expanded judicial jurisdiction over nonresidents. 6  The other
criticisms of the immunity rule were only briefly discussed by the Sev-
59. Keeffe & Roscia, supra note 56, at 480-81, citing Baldwin v. Emerson, 16 R.I.
304, 15 A. 83 (1888).
60. Id.
61. Keeffe & Roscia, supra note 56, at 475. "Litigants always and everywhere are
subject to distraction. Courts do not usually take cognizance of them unless they inter-
fere with the progress of the suit. The test should not be the sentimental one of distrac-
tion but the real one of obstruction." Id.
62. Wangler v. Harvey, 41 N.J. 277, 284-85, 196 A.2d 513, 517 (1963). See also
Keeffe & Roscia, supra note 56, at 485.
63. 41 N.J. at 284-85, 196 A.2d at 517.
64. Keeffe & Roscia, supra note 56, at 485.
65. See, e.g., Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 710, 16 P.2d 741, 742 (1932);
Wangler v. Harvey, 41 NJ. 277, 282, 196 A.2d 513, 515 (1963); Keeffe & Roscia, supra
note 56, at 485.
66. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 760, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
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ern court6 7 and were not relied upon by the court in reaching its de-
cision; the court abolished the immunity rule almost wholly in response
to the changes which have been made in California's judicial jurisdic-
tional powers. The Severn decision can only be understood in light
of these changes, which reflect a continuing process of development in
the concept of jurisdiction over the person occurring in the United
States with the impetus of several major Supreme Court decisions.
Development of the Concept of Jurisdiction over the Person
In personam jurisdiction-the power of a court to adjudicate the
personal legal rights of parties properly brought before it-requires that
the court not only have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,
but also that it have jurisdiction over each party to the action."" Obtain-
ing jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff generally presents no
problem in a civil action, since the plaintiff usually chooses the forum
and actively seeks the court's assumption of jurisdiction over him. A
defendant may also consent to the jurisdiction of the court, or by a vol-
untary general appearance before the court he may evidence his will-
ingness that the cause of action should be tried before it. Both consent
and a voluntary general appearance before the court have traditionally
been valid bases upon which a court could assert its power over the
person of the litigant, and bind him by its judgment.6 9
The immunity rule is obviously inapplicable to situations where
a nonresident defendant, within the state to attend a judicial proceeding,
consents to the court's assumption of jurisdiction over him in an un-
related action which is brought against him once he is within the state.
Clearly, the act of challenging jurisdiction by asserting the immunity
doctrine and the act of submitting to the court's jurisdiction are in-
compatible, one precluding the other.
However, where there has been no consent or general appearance
by the nonresident, the immunity rule may shield him from the court's
assertion of jurisdiction over his person under the "physical presence,"
or "territorial power," theory. Justice Field stated the physical pres-
ence doctrine in the famous Supreme Court decision of Pennoyer v.
67. Id. at 758, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
68. Green, supra note 14, at 1220. There are two other traditional classifications
of a court's jurisdictional powers. In rem jurisdiction is the power of a court to deal
with a thing (for instance, a parcel of land) and to determine its status in relation to
the legal rights of all persons known and unknown. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is the
power to adjudicate the status of a thing against the rights of the named parties only.
See the discussion in id. at 1221-22.
69. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890) (voluntary general appearance establishes
jurisdiction); Green, supra note 14, at 1228-29; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS
OF LAWS § 32 (consent) & § 33 (voluntary appearance) (1969).
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Neff.70  Briefly, the doctrine is based on the assumption that a state
or nation has complete sovereign control over all persons and things
within its boundaries.7 1 This assumption leads to the conclusion that
the physical presence of a person within a state's territory automatically
provides sufficient grounds for the assertion of jurisdiction over him by
a court of that state. 72  Although the state may exercise its control by
arresting a person, the assertion of judicial power is usually made in
a civil case by the service of process upon the person while he is within
the state's territory.78
After the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, the act of service of proc-
ess upon a person physically present within the state has consistently
been held sufficient to subject the person to the state's judicial jurisdic-
tion, regardless of how temporary the presence may have been.74 For
many years, service of process made upon a person while he was pres-
ent within the jurisdiction was the only means by which a person could
be brought under the court's power if he neither consented to being
sued in that forum nor made a general appearance before the court.
Today, physical presence remains the most common and least fre-
quently challenged basis of jurisdiction.75
The immunity rule developed as a means of providing some flex-
ibility in the application of this physical presence doctrine, allowing the
court the discretionary power to exempt from the doctrine those non-
residents who entered the jurisdiction for the purpose of attending court
proceedings. 78 As previously discussed, the better rationale for the im-
munity rule is not to give the nonresident special protection against the
power of the foreign court; rather, it is to aid the court proceedings
by assuring that nonresidents will not avoid court appearances solely
because of their fear of being brought under the judicial jurisdiction
of the forum in other actions. Although the rule came into being when
a nonresident could be forced to submit to the court's jurisdiction over
70. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). "[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sov-
ereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . [and] no State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory." Id. at
72Z.
71. Green, supra note 14, at 1227.
72. See note 70 supra.
73. Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long-Arm Turisdiction in California Under New Section
410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTGs L.I. 1163, 1171 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Gorfinkel & Lavine].
74. Id. at 1171; see, e.g., Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959)
(upholding service made while defendant was in plane passing over the state); Fisher,
Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 A. 714 (1895) (service on American tempo-
rarily stopping at a hotel in England gives English court jurisdiction).
75. JuDicuL CoUNcIL OF CALiFoRNA, 1969 JUDIcrAL COUNcIL REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND THE LEoisLATuRE, app. I, 72.
76. See text accompanying notes 13-19 supra.
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his person only under the physical presence doctrine, it is still used to-
day, when the means by which a defendant may be subjected to the
personal jurisdiction of a court have expanded far beyond the limits set
in Pennoyer v. Neff.
A major departure from the traditional theories of personal juris-
diction was made in a series of Supreme Court cases, beginning with
Hess v. Pawloski.77 In that case the Massachusetts nonresident motor-
ist statute was upheld, and the principle was established that the per-
formance of certain single acts within a state could be sufficient basis
for asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident individual.78  Jurisdiction
over nonresidents for claims resulting from doing business within the
state was recognized by the Court in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Good-
man;79 and in Milliken v. Meyer,80 domicile was held to be another
valid basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person by a state court.
The effect of these decisions was that various statutory bases for the
assertion of jurisdiction over the person were accepted, in addition to
the common law basis of physical presence.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington81 the Supreme Court
abandoned its situational approach to the question of judicial jurisdic-
tion, and formulated a broad test to gauge whether the assertion of ju-
risdiction in any given case would be constitutionally permissible. De-
livering the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Stone stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
77. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The decision was based on the theory that a nonresi-
dent motorist by using a state's highways impliedly consents to the state's assertion of
personal jurisdiction over him in tort cases arising from his operation of a vehicle on
state roads. See the discussion in Green, supra note 14, at 1219-30.
78. Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909,
945 (1960).
79. 294 U.S. 623 (1935). The court upheld an Iowa statute subjecting nonresi-
dent dealers in securities to the state's jurisdiction for claims related to local transactions.
80. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
81. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the appellant, a Delaware cor-
poration with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, had about a dozen
salesmen in Washington exhibiting shoes and soliciting orders on a commission basis.
The state of Washington had sued to collect an amount due the state unemployment
compensation fund under a state statute and had recovered a judgment in a Washington
State court. On appeal, the foreign corporation alleged that it was not doing business
in Washington and was therefore not subject to suit in Washington courts. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the state court decision, holding that as long as a foreign
corporation had minimum contacts with the forum, subjecting it to the state's judicial
jurisdiction would not offend due process of law. Id. It is generally agreed that the
minimum contacts doctrine of International Shoe applies to individuals and partnerships
as well as to corporations. Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 31 Cal. App.
3d 991, 996, 107 Cal. Rptr. 744, 747 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 845 (1969); Gorfinkel & Lavine, supra note 73, at 1180.
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the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. '82
The Court in International Shoe disapproved any mechanical or
quantitative criteria for determining whether minimum contacts existed
between a defendant and the forum." Instead, the Court adopted a
reasonableness test: Do the contacts of the defendant with the state
make it reasonable to require him to defend that particular suit in the
state?84 In determining whether the assertion of in personam jurisdic-
tion were reasonable, the Court considered relevant both an estimate
of the inconveniences to each party 8 and an estimate of the quality
and nature of the activity being conducted by the defendant within the
forum."
The vague "minimum contacts" theory of International Shoe was
further defined in two later Supreme Court decisions, McGee v. Inter-
national Life Insurance Co.s1 and Hanson v. Denckla.18 Lower federal
82. 326 U.S. at 316.
83. Id. at 319.
84. Id. at 317.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 319.
87. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, a foreign insurance company was sued in
California for payment under a life insurance policy. It appeared that the insurance
company had never solicited or done any insurance business in California apart from
this one policy, which was transacted by mail. The Court held that the assumption of
jurisdiction by California did not offend due process where the insurance contract was
delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there, the insured was a resident
of the state and died there, and where there was a substantial state interest in protecting
residents from insurers who refused to pay. Id.
McGee established that the minimum contacts necessary between the defendant and
the forum before judicial jurisdiction could be asserted could consist of a single act or
transaction. Since a transaction by mail was sufficient to bring the foreign corporation
within the state court's jurisdiction in McGee, it was clear that neither the defendant
nor his agent ever had to be physically present within the forum to satisfy the require-
ments of due process.
For a discussion of the effects of both McGee and Hanson, see Comment, Jurisdic-
tion Over Non-resident Corporations Based on a Single Act, 47 GEo. LJ. 342 (1958).
88. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, decided the year after McGee, the primary
issue was whether a Florida court could determine the validity of powers of appointment
executed by the settlor in Florida but affecting a trust res located in Delaware, when
the Delaware trustees did not appear at the proceeding. The Court held that the Florida
court had no personal jurisdiction over the trustees when the only connection between
the trustees and the state was some correspondence between the settlor and the trustees.
Id.
Hanson restricted the principle established in McGee that a single act could consti-
tute minimum contacts with the forum, holding that the act done or transaction con-
summated in the forum must be one "by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." Id. at 253. Under this test, a unilateral act by a resident
or another person could not satisfy the requirement that there be contact between the
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and state courts have continued to develop the theory, 9 still relying
on the basic principles first established in this line of Supreme Court
cases.
It is clear under the minimum contacts theory of International
Shoe that once the extent of the defendant's activities within the forum
has been assessed, the court must still decide whether the totality of
the circumstances makes it fair and just to require the nonresident to
enter and defend the cause of action in the forum.90 This aspect of
the minimum contacts theory reveals a different philosophy toward per-
sonal jurisdiction than that expressed in the physical presence theory
of Pennoyer v. Neff. Under the older doctrine, considerations of fair-
ness are not taken into account in determining if due process has been
satisfied and jurisdiction established.9" In any given cause of action,
a nonresident who is not subject to out-of-state service because he does
not have minimum contacts with a jurisdiction may still be forced to
nonresident defendant and the forum. Id. Later lower court decisions have not estab-
lished that Hanson's requirement of a "purposeful availment" of the privilege of conduct-
ing business within the forum state requires an entry or activity within the forum; juris-
diction has been assumed when persons or property within the state have been affected
by the defendant's acts outside the state. Gorfinkel & Lavine, supra note 73, at 1188;
see, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969) (economic benefit by defendant from sale or use of its product in the
state sufficient contact to establish jurisdiction).
Hanson imposed a further limitation on the minimum contacts doctrine by requiring
that the nonresident's activity within the state give rise to the cause of action in which
the state is attempting to assert jurisdiction. 357 U.S. at 251. This rule has not been
strictly followed by subsequent lower court decisions. For example, California courts
have held that if the cause of action is not connected with the forum, the nonresident's
contacts with the state must be more "substantial" in order to establish jurisdiction than
the contacts which would be required if the cause of action was connected with the
forum. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 898-99, 458
P.2d 57, 61-62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117-18 (1969) (forum-related activity must reach such
extensive or wide-ranging proportions as to make the defendant "present"); Fisher Gov-
ernor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 225, 347 P.2d 1, 3, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1959)
(more contacts required than sales or sales promotion); Vibration Isolation Products,
Inc. v. American Nat'l Rubber Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d 480, 483-84, 100 Cal. Rptr. 269,
271 (1972) (more contacts required than sales or sales promotion).
89. See cases cited note 88 supra.
90. Comment, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based on a Single Act,
47 GEO. L.J. 342, 351-52 (1958). In Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court listed several factors it felt were relevant to the assumption of
jurisdiction. These included: (1) the interest of the state in providing a forum for resi-
dents; (2) the interest of the state in regulating the business involved; (3) the relative
availability of the evidence and the burden of litigating in one locality compared to an-
other; (4) the ease of access to an alternative forum; (5) the interest in avoiding mul-
tiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; (6) the extent to which the cause of ac-
tion arose out of defendant's local activities. 53 Cal. 2d 222, 225-26, 347 P.2d 1, 3-
4, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3-4 (1959).
91. See notes 70-75 & accompanying text supra.
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defend in the forum if he is served with process while physically present
there.9 2
The trend expanding the scope of jurisdiction over the persons of
nonresidents has continued as the minimum contacts theory has de-
veloped through court decisions.as However, the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment still presents a barrier to the unlimited
extension of long-arm jurisdiction by state courts.9 4 Noting the con-
stitutional limitations, the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla cau-
tioned that the trend toward the expansion of state court jurisdiction
did not portend the eventual disappearance of all restrictions. No mat-
ter how minimal the burdens on a nonresident served outside the forum
of defending a cause of action in that forum, the state cannot force
him to do so unless he has the requisite minimum contacts with it.95
California Long-Arm Jurisdiction
Many states have enacted long-arm statutes which take full advan-
tage of the different theories upon which jurisdiction over nonresidents
may be based. However, before the new long-arm provisions were en-
acted in California, the statutory law of this state imposed much stricter
standards on jurisdiction over nonresident individuals than were re-
quired by the Supreme Court decisions to satisfy due process of law.
Former section 417 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 6 limited
assumption of jurisdiction over individuals personally served with proc-
ess outside the state to those persons who were residents of California
at the time of the commencement of the action, at the time the cause
of action arose, or at the time of service.9r Jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents who were served with process outside the state was provided for
only in the special cases of nonresident motorists, 9 8 nonresident boat-
92. The inconsistency of the traditional bases of jurisdiction with the recent em-
phasis on convenience and fairness has prompted at least one student note to suggest
that these traditional bases be dropped completely, leaving minimum contacts as the only
criteria for determining if due process is satisfied. See Developments in the Law: State-
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAnv. L REv. 909 (1960). See also Ehrenzweig, The Transient
Rule of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 YALE LI. 289 (1956).
93. Green, supra note 14, at 1230-33.
94. BASIC CIVIL PROCEDuRE supra note 1, at 35 (1972). Besides the due process
requirements, the First Amendment protections regarding free speech and free press rein-
force the jurisdictional barrier in libel suits, and the commerce clause may offer another
possible restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 35 & n.118.
95. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
96. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1 at 3052 (repealed 1969).
97. Gorfinkel and Lavine comment that "resident" as used in section 417 was in-
terpreted to mean "domiciliary." Gorfinkel & Lavine, supra note 73, at 1173 (citing
Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955), as the origin of this interpreta-
tion).
98. CAL. VEI. CODE §§ 17450-58 (West 1971) (originally enacted by Cal. Stat.
1935, ch. 27, § 404 at 154, and subsequently amended and renumbered).
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owners, 99 and nonresident aircraft operators. 100
In contrast, the minimum contacts doctrine had been utilized as
a means of establishing jurisdiction over nonresident corporations for
many years before the new legislation was passed. This occurred be-
cause former section 411 of the code, 101 which defined the limits of
jurisdiction over nonresident corporations in terms of a "doing business"
test, was interpreted after International Shoe to allow jurisdiction over
foreign corporations to the extent permissible under the due process
clause. 102
In 1969, the California legislature significantly expanded the lim-
its of California state court jurisdiction by enacting a new title, "Jur-
isdiction and Service of Process," of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure.103 This was the first comprehensive revision of the California
jurisdiction statutes since their original enactment in 1872.104 By this
legislation, California Code of Civil Procedure sections 411 and 417
were superseded by new sections 410.10 and 413.10.
Section 410.10 defines the extent of California's long-arm jurisdic-
tion quite succinctly:
A court of -this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States.' 0 5
This new statute has had minimal effect on California's exercise of ju-
risdiction over foreign corporations, since former section 411 had al-
ready been interpreted to allow the broadest jurisdiction which was con-
stitutionally possible. 10 6  Section 410.10 did make a significant change
in California's jurisdiction over individuals, who are now subject to the
99. CAL. HAR. & NAY. CODE §§ 600-09 (West Supp. 1974) (added by Cal. Stat.
1963, ch. 1280, § 1 at 2805-06).
100. CAL PuB. UTIL. CODE § 21414 (West 1965) (added by Cal. Stat. 1957, ch.
251, § 1 at 905). See Comment, The Development of In Personam Jurisdiction over
Individuals and Corporations in California: 1849-1970, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1105 (1970),
for a more detailed discussion of these statutes.
101. Most recently amended in Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 2 at 345 (repealed 1969).
102. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 898, 458 P.2d 57, 61,
80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117 (1969); Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77,
82, 346 P.2d 409, 413 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 927 (1960); Fisher Governor Co.
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 224, 347 P.2d 1, 2, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1959); Henry
R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 858, 323 P.2d 437, 439 (1958).
103. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1610, § 3 at 3363, adding §§ 410.10-18.10 (operative July
1, 1970).
104. P. Li, ATTORNEY'S GumE TO CALIFORNIA JURISDICTION AND PROCESS 1 (1970)
(C.E.B. guide).
105. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (West 1973).
106. See notes 101-02 & accompanying text supra; Comment, In Personam Jurisdic-
tion: New Horizons in California, 1 PAc. L.J. 671, 694 (1970).
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state's long-arm powers to the same extent as corporations.' By its
broad wording, the statute has adopted the federal constitutional trends
of the future, as well as the decisions of the past, as guidelines for the
jurisdiction of California courts.' 0 8
California's broad approach has both advantages and disadvan-
tages. Many problems of statutory construction which plague other
states are avoided because section 410.10 does not enumerate specific
circumstances under which jurisdiction may be assumed. This elimi-
nates the need for a court to make a two-step analysis of jurisdictional
questions by deciding first whether jurisdiction is possible within the
wording of the statute, and then determining whether the due process
requirements are met.'0 9 Also, section 410.10 allows California courts
to take advantage of the minimum contacts doctrine to the fullest ex-
tent, as that doctrine continues to develop." 0
Unfortunately, the broad wording of California's long-arm statute
eliminates any language of definition or clarification as well as any lan-
guage of restriction. The self-limiting provisions by which other states
have avoided reaching the constitutional issues of due process are not
present, so California courts must continually evaluate what the con-
stitutional limitations are. This task is made more difficult because the
United States Supreme Court has made no recent decision in this area,
and the refining of the minimum contacts doctrine has been left to the
lower courts."'
Section 413.1012 supplements the long-arm powers given Cali-
fornia courts in section 410.10 by allowing service of summons upon
persons outside the state, and even outside the country."13 Service of
summons properly made upon the defendant is necessary in order to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court and vest it with the authority to
make an in personam adjudication. The act of service also gives the
defendant notice of the suit so that he has an opportunity to defend."14
The joint operation of sections 410.10 and 413.10 now allows out-of-
107. "Under the new law the California courts may now exercise long-arm jurisdic-
tion over any type of absent defendant in any type of case in which the contacts of
the defendant with the state are such that the exercise of jurisdiction 'does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice .... Green, supra note 14, at
1242.
108. Id. at 1242-43.
109. Gorfinkel & Lavine, supra note 73, at 1166-67.
110. Id. at 1167.
111. Id. at 1168. See, e.g., cases cited note 88 supra.
112. CAL. CoDn Crv. PRoc. § 413.10 (West 1973) (operative July 1, 1970).
113. "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a summons shall be served on a per-
son: (a) Within this state. . . (b) Outside this state but within the United States...
(c) Outside the United States. . . ." Id.
114. 13A*i Cwv Pocaiouar, supra note 1, at 43.
state service upon nonresident individuals in any action where the mini-
mum contacts standard is satisfied, whereas nonresidents were prev-
iously subject to California jurisdiction while outside the territorial lim-
its of the state only under the nonresident motorist, boatowner, and air-
craft operator statutes.' 15
As in the case of foreign corporations,"" the liberal minimum con-
tacts standard does not allow California courts to assume jurisdiction
over every nonresident individual who is correctly served with out-of-
state process. Although additional statutory restrictions have disap-
peared, those imposed by the due process clause still apply, and limit
the state's judicial power over nonresidents. Several California cases
dealing with the validity of long-arm jurisdiction over an individual, de-
cided after section 410.10 was enacted, have held that minimum con-
tacts did not exist between the state and the nonresident defendant. 117
Thus, recent California decisions involving both individual and cor-
115. See notes 98-100 & accompanying text supra
116. See, e.g., Kourkene v. American BBR, Inc., 313 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1963) (ju-
risdiction over foreign corporation denied where only a few isolated activities in Califor-
nia, none connected with the cause of action); L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins
Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959) (no jurisdiction where the defendant foreign
corporation shipped $1,000,000 of merchandise into the state annually but the merchan-
dise was not connected with the contract sued upon, and no other contacts existed with
California); Belmont Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 3d 281, 107 Cal. Rptr.
237 (1973) (no jurisdiction where contract negotiated through interstate communica-
tions and consummated outside the state); Vibration Isolation Prods., Inc. v. American
Nat'l Rubber Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d 480, 100 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1972) (no jurisdiction
where foreign corporation sold only a small quantity of its products to California buyers
and had not known the product would be sold and shipped there); daSilveira v. West-
phalia Separator Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967) (no jurisdiction
where outright sale to independent distributor in another state).
117. In Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Org. Inc., 31 Cal. App. 3d 991, 107 Cal. Rptr.
744 (1973), allegations in the complaint charging three individual nonresidents with
making or disseminating misleading statements to the public were not supported by any
affidavits or declarations of fact. The nonresidents admitted visits and correspondence
to the state which were unconnected with the transactions upon which the complaint
was based. The court held that the record failed to establish minimum contacts and
affirmed the order to quash service. Titus v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 100
Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972), was an action by a California resident against her nonresident
former husband to establish a foreign divorce decree in California and get child custody
and support. Since the children were present in the state, the court determined that it
had jurisdiction to decide their status through a custody proceeding. However, there was
no personal jurisdiction over the husband which would allow the court to adjudicate the
child support issue. He had been served outside California, and his act of sending his
children to the state to visit their mother pursuant to a written agreement sent there
for her signature did not satisfy the minimum contacts standard. Id. at 802, 100 Cal.
Rptr. at 485. See also Marra v. Shea, 321 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (§ 410.10
was applied, and it was held that no minimum contacts existed between either of the
two nonresidents and California); Schoch v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1200, 90
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porate nonresidents serve as a reminder that limitations still exist upon
the assertion of a state's judicial power beyond its own boundaries.
California Long-Arm Powers and the Immunity Rule:
The Decision of the Severn Court
The effect of the immunity rule has been to shelter select nonresi-
dents from the operation of the physical presence doctrine, which al-
lows jurisdiction over a person to be based on his personal receipt of
summons while physically present within the forum. 118 Until the pas-
sage of the jurisdictional reform legislation in 1969, a nonresident in-
dividual would usually be subject to California's judicial jurisdiction
only under this physical presence doctrine. However, sections 410.10
and 413.10 now make nonresidents susceptible to out-of-state service
of process and to the assertion of jurisdiction based upon the minimum
contacts theory." 9 These recent changes in state court jurisdiction
over nonresidents prompted the Severn court carefully to scrutinize the
immunity rule, which had been developed and justified under the ear-
lier jurisdictional laws.
After examining the expanding effect of the new code sections
410.10 and 413.10 on the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents, 2 0
the Severn court reconsidered the two principles for applying the immu-
nity rule established by the Supreme Court in Lamb v. Schmitt.' Rea-
soning that no "judicial necessities" requiring the utilization of the im-
munity doctrine exist within this state any longer, the court declared:
By virtue of these statutes, the reason for the immunity rule no
longer exists in California, for nonresident witnesses and others
may no longer remain in the state or country of their residence se-
cure from the reach of this state's process. The rule no longer
offers encouragement to nonresidents, who otherwise would be
immune from service of its process, to enter this state in aid of its
"judicial administration."'122
Since the Severn court also followed the other principle approved by
the Lamb decision-limiting the privilege to the court itself and not
recognizing immunity as a substantive right of the individual 2 3-it
reached the conclusion that the immunity rule had outlived its purpose
Cal. Rptr. 365 (1970) (under old § 417 no jurisdiction existed over nonresident father
in suit for future failure to support, but no opinion as to whether minimum contacts
would have been established under new § 410.10).
118. See note 76 & accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 103-17 & accompanying text supra.
120. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 760, 762, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 331, 333.
121. See notes 52-53 & accompanying text supra.
122. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
123. See note 52 & accompanying text supra.
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in this state, and accordingly held that it was no longer the law in Cal-
ifornia." 4
Analysis of the Severn Decision
The Severn court accepted the viewpoint that the only valid reason
for allowing the immunity rule in the first place was to aid judicial ad-
ministration by encouraging nonresidents to enter the forum and attend
court proceedings. 115  Theoretically, if a nonresident were guaranteed
immunity from service of process, he would enter a jurisdiction that he
might otherwise avoid because of his fear of being subjected to addi-
tional litigation while he was present there. Keeping this rationale for
the immunity doctrine in mind, the Severn court reviewed California's
jurisdictional powers to determine whether a nonresident really was
more susceptible to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the state
while within its territory. It concluded that California's expanded long-
arm powers had recently made the nonresident as vulnerable to the
state's jurisdiction while he was outside its boundaries as he was while
within them.2 6 It was on the basis of this belief that the Severn court
abolished the immunity rule, reasoning that a nonresident would no
longer have any cause to avoid entering California if he could just as
easily be served outside the state. A careful review of the various
bases upon which jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident can be
founded reveals that although the assumptions of the Severn court are
valid for foreign corporations, they are not valid for nonresident indi-
viduals.
With respect to foreign corporations, it should be emphasized that
although a corporation can be served by making the service of summons
on one of its officers or agents, the corporation cannot be subjected to
a court's jurisdiction solely on the basis of that officer or agent's pres-
ence or acts within the forum.'2 7 Under California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 410.10, the most liberal standard upon which jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation can be based is currently the minimum
contacts test.' 28 Whether service of process is made within or without
the state, the degree of contacts needed between the forum and the
corporation to establish minimum contacts is identical. Therefore, an
agent of the corporation would have no reason to fear that his entrance
into the forum to attend court would subject his corporation to the ju-
risdiction of a state that would otherwise lack the power to adjudicate
a specific cause of action.
124. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
125. See notes 49-53 & accompanying text supra.
126. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
127. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
128. See discussion in notes 103-06 & accompanying text supra.
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The nonresident individual's situation, however, is not analogous
to that of the foreign corporation and its agent. A nonresident indi-
vidual who is served while he is present within a forum may be brought
within the judicial jurisdiction of that forum for any transitory cause of
action 129 because of the physical presence theory of jurisdiction an-
nounced in Pennoyer v. Neff.' 30 In contrast, if that nonresident indi-
vidual is served under the long-arm provisions of sections 410.10 and
413.10 while outside California, he is-subject to the state's in personam
jurisdiction only if minimum contacts between him and the state can
be established for a particular cause of action.' 3' In the absence of
minimum contacts, a nonresident will know he is safe from the exercise
of California's long-arm powers, but he will still fear that entry into the
state may subject him to its jurisdiction because of the possibility of serv-
ice while he is present there:
In many instances, it may be impossible for a nonresident to de-
cide with any certainty if he could be served in a particular cause of
action under California's long-arm statute, since the minimum contacts
doctrine is not a settled or strictly defined rule. In such a case, the
nonresident would certainly be hesitant to enter the state to participate
voluntarily in court proceedings and thereby give the plaintiff an oppor-
tunity to subject him to California's jurisdiction on the basis of presence.
At least if he awaits service pursuant to the long-arm statute he has the
option of making a special appearance to contest jurisdiction on the
grounds that the minimum contacts test has not been met. If he enters
and is served while present within the state, the court's jurisdiction is
established; he may only urge that jurisdiction be declined under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 3 2
129. Most actions brought in the United States are considered transitory, which
means that they may be brought in any forum where a court otherwise competent to
hear the particular type of controversy can get jurisdiction over the parties. Develop-
ments in the Law: State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAv. L. Rlv. 909, 911 (1960). Some
actions which are not transitory include actions concerning the penal or tax laws of an-
other state; actions dealing with the internal affairs of a foreign corporation; actions to
determine interests and rights in real property outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
court (so-called "local actions") and divorce actions between two non-domiciliaries. Id.
at 911-12.
This "transient rule" has been critized because it may force a defendant to litigate
in a distant forum, or impose inconveniences upon a court which is called upon to hear
an action substantially unrelated to the forum. Id. at 1009.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens operates to mitigate the harshness of this
rule, since a court may decline jurisdiction where it feels that an exercise of jurisdiction
would be unfair, or burdensome to the court. Id. at 1009. This doctrine has been codi-
fied in California. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.30 (West 1973).
130. See notes 70-75, 91-92 & accompanying text supra.
131. See cases cited notes 103-17 supra.
132. See note 129 supra.
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Since the Severn court determined that defendant Dassler could
have been served at his residence or place of business in Europe 13 and
brought under California's jurisdiction through the minimum contacts
theory,134 it could rightly have concluded that "judicial necessities" did
not warrant the utilization of the immunity rule in his case. However,
the wording of the decision indicates that the court's ruling was much
broader, holding that no judicial necessities could exist in California
which would require the use of the immunity rule for any nonresi-
dent.135  It is this generalization by the court which is incorrect.
Clearly, nonresident individuals not subject to the state's long-arm
power may still fear service of process and the assertion of jurisdiction
by the state courts if they enter California. In such situations the im-
munity doctrine could still serve its purpose of inducing court attend-
ance by the nonresident.
Conclusion
The Severn decision is wrong to the extent that it generalizes,
finding the immunity rule totally inapplicable in California because of
the state's new long-arm statute. However, its approach of analyzing
the interaction between the state's jurisdictional power over nonresi-
dents and the common law immunity rule is certainly one which future
courts should follow. The Supreme Court in Lamb v. Schmitt had
voiced the principle, approved by the Severn court, that the privilege
"should be extended or withheld only as judicial necessities require."' 30
Judicial necessities require the application of the immunity doctrine
only when a nonresident might be discouraged from entering California
because he fears the possibility of being served within the state when
he would remain safe from service outside the state.
Immunity from service of process should therefore be granted a
nonresident who is present within the state to attend judicial proceed-
ings when he could not have been served in the particular action out-
side California.' 37 In this way, protection from the harsh effects of the
physical presence doctrine would be offered without extending unnec-
essary immunity to those nonresidents who would have been subject
to the state's service of process regardless of their entrance into the ju-
risdiction. Such a limitation would be a more sound response to the
changes in California's jurisdictional powers over nonresidents than
133. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
134. Id. at 756, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
135. Id. at 762, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
136. 285 U.S. at 225.
137. See Note, Pleading and Procedure: Immunity from Service of Civil Process,
48 CALIF. L. Rav. 867 (1960), for the suggestion that a nonresident be allowed to move
for a protective order before entering the jurisdiction to attend court.
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would complete elimination of the rule. Whether future California de-
cisions will reaffirm the utility of the immunity rule in certain situations
and continue to apply it, or will approve the drastic solution of the Sev-
ern court and discardthe rule completely, remains to be seen.
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